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ARTICLES
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ: REINVIGORATING THE
FEDERAL BALANCE
BY MAINTAINING THE STATES' ROLE AS THE





In United States v. Lopez,' the United States Supreme Court kicked off a wide-
ranging debate about the proper division of power between the federal government and
the states when it held-for the first time since 1936-that Congress had exceeded the
power granted to it by the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce.2 The case
began when Texas prosecutors charged Alfonso Lopez, Jr. with violating a Texas law
prohibiting the possession of firearms on school grounds. State charges were dismissed
the next day, however, when federal prosecutors charged Lopez with violating a feder-
al law prohibiting the same conduct. 3 In an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority under the Comm-
erce Clause by enacting the federal "Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, ' '4 because it
was "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any
other sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."5
* Criminal Justice Counsel, Office of the Cook County Public Defender; J.D., Loyola University
School of Law, 1984; M.A., Loyola University, Chicago, 1985. Assistant Public Defender, Office of
the Cook County Public Defender; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1985.
1. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (regulating wages and hours for coal
miners); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Kills Law Banning Guns in a School Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 1995, at Al.
3. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624.
4. Id. (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988)).
5. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (footnote omitted). The majority also rejected the government's
contention that the possession of firearms in a local school zone substantially affected interstate com-
merce by increasing the costs of crime, inhibiting travel, and decreasing productivity as a consequence
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Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by three others, warned that the majority opinion in-
jected uncertainty into a number of other federal criminal laws.6 To some commenta-
tors, the opinion created an even broader uncertainty over a range of federal laws far
beyond the criminal context, because the Court gave lower courts "no principle...
[to] distinguish between proper and improper congressional power."7 Because the
Commerce Clause serves as the constitutional foundation for many federal laws, some
commentators viewed Lopez as potentially the start of a new era of states' rights and
limited federal government, an era which could include limits on federal laws banning
assault weapons and violence at abortion clinics, removal of federal restrictions on land
use, cut-backs in environmental and civil rights laws, and a curtailment of the federal
regulatory state through new restrictions on Congress's ability to delegate power to
executive agencies.'
Lopez, however, may not herald such a broad revision of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Rather, it is more likely the Court is attempting to redress a federal
intrusion into the enforcement of criminal laws, an area traditionally reserved to the
states. As Justice Rehnquist noted in the majority opinion, this intrusion tips the fragile
balance of power between the federal government and the states, undermining the
federal structure of American government.9 The assertion of federal power in this area
is especially dangerous because, as Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist, it
touches on the states' key role as the "immediate and visible guardians of life and
property."' ° Moreover, as Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly pointed out in his capacity
as head of the Judicial Conference of the United States, federal encroachment into
criminal law threatens to inundate the federal courts with criminal cases, thereby dilut-
ing or destroying their effectiveness." In addressing these concerns, the majority has
sent the Lopez case, and potentially thousands of similar cases, back to where they
started-state court.
I. THE STATE-FEDERAL BALANCE AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Lopez is about how our federal system protects individual liberty. As crafted by
the Framers, this liberty is assured through structural limits on American govern-
ment. 2 According to Alexis DeTocqueville, the federal government provides the na-
tion with strength, unity, power, and prestige. 3 In The Federalist, Hamilton noted that
the nation's powers are suited to the regulation of "[clommerce, finance, negotiation
of a diminished educational environment. If the law was upheld, the Court concluded that such tenuous
influences on interstate commerce would justify the federal government in exerting a broad police
power over virtually any activity.
6. Id. at 1665.
7. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Court Moves to Reign in Federal Control; Gun Case Ruling a Re-
buke to Congress, CIII. TRIB. Apr. 27, 1995, at 1 (quoting University of Chicago Law School Profes-
sor Larry Lessig).
8. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Back to the Future, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1995, at A33;
Judgment Day, THE NATION, at 453 (Oct. 23, 1995); High Court Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995
(editorial).
9. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624-29.
10. THm FEDERALIST No. 17, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
11. William H, Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary; 1994 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary; Remarks Before the House of Delegates at A.B.A. Mid-Year Meeting.
12. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
13. 1 ALExIs DETOCQUEV.L.E, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 168 (1945).
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and war."' 4 The federal government, however, is by its very nature limited, for its
powers are only those specifically enumerated by the United States Constitution."3
These powers granted by the people are chained by structural mechanisms such as the
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review.'
6
Unlike the federal government, the states retain "numerous and indefinite" pow-
ers."'7 Possessing this reserve of powers, the states are able to balance the power of
the federal government. Such a balance is necessary because "government must be
constructed in such a way as to control the passions and encourage virtue. This could
only be accomplished through balancing each of the powers of government against
others, and basing government itself on the impartial rule of law."'8 As James Madi-
son pointed out, the states therefore check the potentially dominant power of the feder-
al government. Two governments thus secure liberty more effectively than one. 9 Like
the separation of powers within the federal government, the "healthy balance of power
between the states and the federal government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front."20
The doctrine of balance mirrored the actual arrangement of powers between the
Parliament and the early colonial legislatures. The doctrine developed fully and explic-
itly in the years leading up to the Revolution, as England attempted to centralize pow-
ers which had become dispersed.2' The ensuing great debate over "the nature and lo-
cation of sovereignty" proved a major cause of the Revolutionary War. In the new na-
tion, the formal division of sovereignty between the states and the federal government
was a radical departure in political structure.22
Until the Revolutionary era, the power of government had been considered theo-
retically indivisible. 2' As Blackstone noted in his Commentaries, "there is and must
be in all [forms of government] a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authori-
ty, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside . . , In
England, this absolute power has resided in Parliament since the early 1600's.' Be-
cause this body was neither one nor few, equal and proportionable in its makeup, con-
taining all the states," its power was "not dangerous and need not be restrained.
'2 6
Parliament, believing that it had the authority to tax the colonies, exercised this sover-
eign power which helped foster the Revolution.27
However, Parliamentary supremacy was not enforced on the colonies. There,
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
16. Id. at 1636 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 1630 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 323 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
18. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 535 (1993) (describing John
Adam's "dogma of balance").
19. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1638. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIsT No. 51, at 323
(James Madison); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
20. Id. at 1626 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
21. BERNARD BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REvOLUTON 202-205
(1992).
22. Id. at 198.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 201.
25. Id. at 198.
26. Id. at 200. "The conception of Parliamentmy sovereignty was justified in the end by the theo-
ry of an ultimate supremacy of the people." Id. at 201.
27. Id. at 202, 204-05.
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government was decentralized and the people enjoyed a healthy degree of local autono-
my. In fact, governmental authority had already been divided in practice generations
before it was conceivable as a doctrine. During the Colonial era, Parliament exercised
control over foreign affairs, trade, commerce and navigation, the postal system, and
naturalization. It had the power to make governmental appointments, to legalize or
annul the actions of colonial legislatures, and to regulate the wild lands in the west.
28
The colonies, however, maintained an "area of residual authority, constituting the 'in-
ternal police' of the community, [which] included most of the substance of everyday
life. It had in fact been American agencies that effectively created and maintained law
and order, for there had been no imperial constabulary ... .,2' The Colonial authori-
ties maintained the common law courts, administered justice, and crafted laws govern-
ing the colonists' personal conduct."
This practical division in power in the colonies was upset in the decade preced-
ing the Revolution by Parliament's attempt to assert centralized sovereign power
through actions such as the Townshend Duties, the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and
various strict customs and navigation laws.3 More than a decade of debate in re-
sponse to this effort produced arguments which caught up with the reality of divided
power and set the framework for the doctrine of federalism.3 2 As early as 1765,
Dulany argued that there were areas where "the authority of the superior can't properly
interpose," because of the limits presented "by the powers vested in the inferi-
or ... ,'.' Two years later, in his Letters From a Farmer in Pennsylvania, John
Dickinson argued that a sovereign body need not exercise supreme power over all
matters in its territory, but that it could allow lesser bodies to exercise power within
specified areas.34 By 1774, James Iredell was describing "independent legislatures
each engaged within a separate scale and employed about different objects."3 From
here it was no great leap to design the doctrine of federalism embodied in the new
nation, in which sovereignty rested with the people, who found it beneficial "to divide
and distribute the attributes of governmental sovereignty among different levels of
institutions .... [and to thereby] keep the central government from amassing 'a de-
gree of energy, in order to sustain itself, dangerous to the liberties of the people."' 36
Following these precepts, the Framers' Constitution granted the federal govern-
ment only those powers which it specifically enumerated,37 limited those powers by
structural mechanisms-the separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial
28. Id. at 203.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 204.
31. Id. at 102-03. See also id. at 209 n. 51 (referring to the thesis that America's federal organi-
zation was "largely the product of the practices of the old British empire as it existed before 1764.")
(quoting Andrew McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 215
(1918)); See also BAILYN, supra note 21, at 212-14 (referring to the Stamp Act).
32. Id. at 208-14.
33. Id. at 215. (quoting DANIEL DULANEY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING
TAXES 15 (Annapolis 1765)).
34. Id. at 216 (citing JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA 20-24 (Phil-
adelphia 1768)).
35. Id. at 225 (quoting James Iredell, To the Inhabitants of Great Britain, in LIFE AND CORRE-
SPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 205, 2189 (photo. reprint 1949) (Griffith J. McRee ed., 1857).
36. Id. at 228-29 (quoting JEDEDIAH MORSE, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 394 (photo
reprint 1968) (1824)).
37. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
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review," and balanced those powers against the "numerous and indefinite" powers
retained by the states.39 The Constitution granted few powers to the federal govern-
ment in the enforcement of criminal law, and these were in matters of federal con-
cern-crimes such as piracy, felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting, trea-
son, and offenses against the law of nations.'
The states' control over ordinary law enforcement and the criminal law was an
important power in this division or balance between the federal government and the
states. Indeed, Hamilton believed that, in checking federal power, the states possessed
one "transcendent advantage., 4' They would command the allegiance and the trust of
their citizens as the "immediate and visible guardians of life and property. '42 In
Hamilton's eyes, the federal government posed no threat of usurping this role because
the "regulation of the mere domestic police" held no allure for federal ambitions.4 ' At
the time, Anti-Federalists such as George Mason, Patrick Henry, and the commentator
Brutus, doubted the benign character of the federal government. Brutus warned that the
"federal government, like the British government before 1776... empowered by the
'Necessary and Proper' and the 'supreme law of the land' clauses, 'would totally de-
stroy all the powers of the individual states."44
II. FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT
Time has shown Hamilton wrong and Brutus right. The "regulation of the mere
domestic police" has held an ongoing allure for federal ambitions. Few issues are more
highly charged than crime, few issues gain more popular or press attention, and few
issues have been as hotly debated--or manipulated-in political campaigns. Using
both the "Necessary and Proper" Clause and the Commerce Clause, the federal govern-
ment has extended its power into criminal law, a realm traditionally occupied by the
states, and it has thereby begun to usurp the states' role as the "immediate and visible
guardians of life and property."
Congress began slowly to expand the number of federal crimes based on its pow-
er to make laws "necessary and proper" to carry out its constitutionally-enumerated
powers. Early federal offenses concerned acts harmful to the central government, such
as customs offenses, crimes committed in federal enclaves, and crimes involving inter-
ference with the federal courts.' The serious federal encroachment into criminal law
began in 1872, when Congress protected its postal power by creating federal laws
against mail fraud. These laws could be construed as efforts to protect the specifically-
38. Id. at 2040 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2033 (citing THE FEDERALIsT No. 45 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
40. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 156.
44. BAILYN, supra note 21, at 336 (quoting Brutus V, N.YJ., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in XIV
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 442, 425 (John P.
Kaminsky & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983)).
45. For example, during 1988 Presidential campaign the "Willie Horton" television commercials
successfully exploited and manipulated the "crime" issue, with both accurate and misleading informa-
tion. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIEsON, DIRTY PoLmcs 16-23 (1992). See also Roger J. Miner, Federal
Court Reform Should Begin at the Top, 77 JUDICATURE 104, 105 (1993) ("Every time that Congress
meets, more state crimes are made federal crimes in response to problems of the moment.").
46. Roger J. Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1989 at
16, 17.
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enumerated federal postal power and to fall within the scope of traditional federal
power, as the British government had controlled the postal power during the Colonial
era.' Nonetheless, these laws were aimed at general frauds which might have been
adequately covered by similar state regulation.'
Around the turn of the century, Congress created more federal offenses, justify-
ing its exercise of power through the Commerce Clause. Early statutes included the
Lottery Act, banning the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, and the Mann Act,
named after its sponsor Congressman James Mann (R-IL).49 The Mann Act, formally
known as "The White Slave Traffic Act of 1910," prohibited the interstate transporta-
tion of a woman for the purpose of causing her to engage in an immoral practice. Ac-
cording to Congressman Mann, the law was needed to prevent "vampires and para-
sites" from taking advantage of "some blue-eyed girl and immersing her in dens. of
infamy."'5 Concerns about federalism were swept aside by more emotional arguments.
Congressman Thetus Sims (D-TN), for instance, argued: "How any man can haggle
and higgle over a constitutional provision in the face of such abominations is more
than I can comprehend."'"
Throughout this century, Congress has steadily expanded federal crimes, using
the need to protect the channels of interstate commerce as its justification. The Sup-
reme Court has been a willing ally in this expansion, upholding jurisdiction over activ-
ities "affecting" interstate commerce. 2 Thus, Congress has been able to create federal
offenses by merely adding an interstate element to state crimes such as kidnapping,
theft, transportation of stolen vehicles, flight to avoid prosecution, sexual exploitation
of children, firearms offenses, gambling, credit card counterfeiting, and the theft of
over $10,000 in livestock. This reasoning has increased federal jurisdiction to allow the
federal courts to reach local robbery offenses under the Hobbes Act, local extortion
under the Extortionate Credit Transaction Act, a wide array of conduct if any interstate
travel is involved aiding "unlawful activity" under the Travel Act, and a range of of-
fenses covered under state law under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act. 3 Every horrendous state crime which gains wide media coverage now be-
comes the potential source of yet another federal criminal law. For example, after a
brutal 1992 murder during the theft of a car in Maryland, Congress made armed
carjacking a federal crime if the car had "been transported, shipped or received in
interstate or foreign commerce."54 While this bill allowed Congress to sound "tough
on crime," it was unnecessary, for this conduct was already prohibited by state armed
47. BAILYN, supra note 21, at 202-05. The power to "establish Post Offices" is also specifically
enumerated. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
48. The statute was aimed at frauds "which are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by
thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people of this country." (quoting 45 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Sen.
Farnsworth)).
49. Miner, supra note 46, at 18.
50. H. Scott Wallace, The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to Ruin, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1993 at 8,
10 (quoting 45 CONG. REc. 551 (1910)).
51. Id. (quoting 45 Cong. Rec. 811 (1910)).
52. See Presault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (stating that Congress may regulate activities
when it has a rational basis for finding that they affect interstate commerce); But see Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27 (1968) (stating that more than a trivial impact on commerce is needed
to permit Congress to broadly regulate state or private activities).
53. Miner, supra note 46, at 18.
54. 18 U.S.C § 2119 (Supp. V. 1993).
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robbery and murder laws, and both perpetrators had been sentenced by Maryland
courts to life in prison." In 1994, Congress stepped up its federalization efforts, creat-
ing new federal offenses, including acts of domestic violence which cross state
lines, 56 gang offenses,57 drug offenses," federal "three-strikes-you're-out" provi-
sions,59 and a number of federal death penalty offenses.'
Proposals to federalize state offenses committed with firearms resurface yearly.
In 1991, Sen. Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY) proposed making almost all firearm-related
offenses federal offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentences. Echoes of Con-
gressman Sims' comments on the Mann Act could be heard in Sen. D'Amato's argu-
ment against weighing concerns over tilting the fragile balance of federalism. D'Amato
did not "care two hoots and a holler" about such concerns, and questioned, "When a
woman gets shot and killed and loses three babies, you're telling me I should be wor-
ried about whether the courts should take on additional cases?" ' Not two months af-
ter the Court issued the Lopez opinion, the House Judiciary Committee approved legis-
lation making all firearm offenses, except those committed for personal monetary gain,
subject to federal prosecution as a terrorist act. In supporting the measure, Committee
Chairman Rep. Henry Hyde (R-IL), like Sen. D'Amato, argued that a federal law was
needed to protect women in jeopardy. He cited the example of a man who had been
"betrayed by his wife and had a gun and 'lunges through the living-room window' [as]
an act that 'sounds pretty terroristic to me."'62
The greatest federal encroachment on the states' traditional criminal law power
has been in narcotics laws. The roots of this federal expansion date back to the Harr-
son Narcotics Act of 1914, a statute aimed at regulating drug importation, manufacture,
and distribution. The Act required persons engaged in those activities to register with
the Collector of Internal Revenue, pay taxes and keep detailed records. In 1919, the
Act became a key vehicle for outlawing narcotics when the Treasury Department, in its
role as the Act's enforcing agency, ruled that doctors could not prescribe drugs for
addicts. This trend continued in 1922, when Congress passed the Narcotics Drug Im-
port and Export Act, setting penalties for illegally importing, distributing, selling, or
possessing drugs.63 The serious expansion of federal narcotics laws began when Con-
gress passed the Controlled Substance Act of 1965, which based federal jurisdiction on
the Commerce Clause.' Under the similar Controlled Substances Act of 1970, federal
jurisdiction over narcotics is claimed because, as all drugs look alike, it is not feasible
to attempt to distinguish between those which crossed state lines and those which did
55. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Carjacking and the Commerce Clause, A.B.A.J., Jan. 1994, at 76; Life
Term in Carjacking that Led to Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1993, at A14; 17-Year-OW Is Convicted
of Murder in Maryland Carjacking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at A25 (A Towson, Maryland jury
convicted Rodney Solomon in the carjacking death of Pamela Basu. He was sentenced to life in prison
without parole. Co-defendant Bernard Miller received the same sentence in Howard County, Maryland.).
56. Law to Curb Spouse Abuse Gets First Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at A14.
57. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1797, 2033 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1995)).
58. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 921-924 (West Supp. 1995)).
59. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3559, 3582 (West Supp. 1995)).
60. Id. (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 49 U.S.C.A. (West Supp 1995)).
61. Wallace, supra note 50, at 52.
62. Katherine Q. Seelye, House Panel Adopts a Broad Measure to Fight Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1995, at A10.
63. DAVID R. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT: A HISTORY 169 (1981).
64. Wallace, supra note 50, at 10-11.
19961
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not. In addition, Congress found that even if narcotics did not cross state lines, federal
jurisdiction was warranted because intrastate narcotics activity contributes to interstate
traffic.' Since passage of this Act, federal prosecution of drug crime has skyrocketed,
and now constitutes one-fifth of all federal criminal cases.'
Il. THE EFFECTS OF FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT
A. Eroding the federal-state balance
As the federal government assumes the states' role in controlling crime, it simul-
taneously becomes the focus of citizen demands for political responses to perceived
crime problems and problems in the administration of criminal justice. The response is
predictable: more federal laws, more federal funds, and a more federal system. In this
federalized system, the federal government will assume the states' role as the "imme-
diate and visible guardians of life and property,"67 and as a consequence, it will be
the federal government which comes to command the primary allegiance and trust of
their citizens. So much for Hamilton's view of the states' one "transcendent advan-
tage" in checking federal power.
Such a federal system would begin to close the fifty laboratories of democracy
and thereby centralize America's criminal justice system. Today, the states provide
manageable units of government adaptable to the changing needs of the local popula-
tion. They test new laws and law enforcement policies, target local problems, and
enforce local community standards. Successful experiments can be imitated and mis-
takes can be avoided; when one state's experiment fails, we avoid repeating the same
mistake nation-wide. By their nature, states are also more accountable,' responsive
and flexible than the federal government. Unlike the federal government, they can
quickly pass laws and readily adjust or end policies which do not work. By nationaliz-
ing criminal justice, we shift from these flexible and diverse laboratories to the mono-
lithic federal government, and sacrifice creativity and adaptability for centralization.0
Under such a system, controversial experiments like the federal sentencing guidelines
might be effectively imposed on the states. Instead of dealing with a disastrous, but
contained policy effecting thousands of cases in one or a few states, a federalized sys-
tem would, in one unified push, impose potentially catastrophic policies on millions of
criminal cases.
65. Id. at 12 (citing 21 U.S.C. 801(2), (4) and (5)).
66. Miner, supra note 46, at 18.
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
68. Id.
69. The heightened political accountability of a government to a community is analyzed by
George A. Bermann in Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the
United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 340 (1994), where he defines the notion of a "subsidiarity" as
"express[ing] a preference for government at the most local level consistent with achieving
government's states purposes." Id. at 339. Bermann also discusses the relationship between subsidiarity
and political liberty: "The framers of the U.S. Constitution acted on the basic belief that individual
freedom would be advanced by preventing the undue concentration of power in the same governing
hands." Id. at 341.
70. Miner, supra note 46, at 19, 40.
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B. The federal caseload crisis
In 1989, Judge Roger J. Miner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit warned against the continuing federalization of crimes, noting that "[t]he most
obvious consequence is the overloading of federal courts."'" As Justice Rehnquist not-
ed in a speech before the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1992, this
increase in federal caseloads runs contrary to the Framers' intention that the federal
courts were to "complement state court systems, not supplant them."72 The risk posed
by the wave of federalization is not merely that the Framers' intentions will be violat-
ed; it is, as Justice Rehnquist has warned, that federalization will dilute or destroy the
effectiveness of the federal courts. 3
The federal courts have filled a unique function, quite distinct from that-of the
state courts. In his A.B.A. speech, Justice Rehnquist recalled that the Framers intended
the federal courts to be:
a distinctive judicial forum, performing tasks that state systems, because of political
or structural reasons, could not perform. Throughout the two-hundred year history
of the federal courts, they have maintained their special qualities, handling complex
cases, protecting individual liberties, and adjudicating important national concerns.
These are the jobs they do best-not those better suited to other forums.74
Congress, however, has ignored the judiciary's warnings about inundating the federal
courts with the criminal cases traditionally left to the states, and has instead continued
to expand federal criminal jurisdiction with no boundaries in sight. The potential scale
of this trend is staggering. For instance, the thirty thousand felony cases filed in feder-
al courts in 1991 were dwarfed by the twelve million criminal cases filed in state
courts in that year.75
Large numbers of cases which could have been competently handled in state
courts have already migrated to the federal courts. Broad federal drug laws allow pros-
ecutors to select cases involving only minor amounts of drugs for federal prosecution.
The extent of the federalization of drug offenses is dramatic. In 1980, 25% of federal
inmates were drug offenders; by 1997, 72% percent of inmates are projected to be
drug offenders.76 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his 1994 Year-End Report, one-quar-
ter of all federal criminal cases are now drug cases.77
In his 1992 A.B.A. speech, Justice Rehnquist warned that this onslaught of feder-
al cases threatens to erode the ability of the federal courts to fulfill their unique func-
tions. With huge caseloads, federal "judges will have less time to spend on marginal"
71. Id. at 18.
72. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before the House of Delegates at the American
Bar Association's Mid-Year Meeting, ABA Feb. 4, 1992, at 11.
73. Chief Justice William H, Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary; 1994
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary; Remarks Before the House of Delegates at A.B.A. Mid-Year
Meeting.
74. Rehnquist, supra note 72, at 11.
75. According to the National Center for State Courts, in 1991, 12,430,910 cases were filed. In
1991, 32,130 federal felony cases were filed, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts.
76. Wallace, supra note 50, at 12 (citing the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990)); Rehnquist,
supra note 72, at 12.




cases, and "increased bureaucratization and management strictures will leave judges
less freedom to exercise personal judgment," decreasing judges' "sense of personal
responsibility and accountability." As a consequence, the "high quality of justice" will
be degraded. Rehnquist also warned that expanding the number of federal judges
would dilute the judiciary's quality, and lead to an "unmanageable number of circuits,"
or "appellate courts of unmanageable size," "an increasingly incoherent body of federal
law," and "a Supreme Court incapable of maintaining uniformity in federal law."'78
Already the increase in criminal cases has slowed the progress of civil cases tradition-
ally litigated in federal court, as judges push criminal cases to the front of their docket
in order to comply with the speedy trial requirements of criminal cases. 9
Shifting cases from state to federal courts is also wasteful, for federal courts
forced to take on the burden of litigating cases competently handled by the states,
simply duplicate state and local expenditures for police, prosecutors, judges, and jails.
As Judge Miner observed, "It seems almost unnecessary to observe that two laws on
the same subject lead to duplication-duplication in investigation, duplication in prose-
cution and duplication in punishment."'
The Committee on Long-Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States has already recognized this problem and has examined methods of reducing
access to the federal courts. The Committee has suggested placing limits on federal
litigation in some employment discrimination matters, on disputes over social security,
health and welfare benefits, and has even examined removing the federal courts' diver-
sity jurisdiction altogether.8
C. Discretionary double jeopardy
The concept of double jeopardy "is that the State with all its resources and pow-
er should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an al-
leged offense." 2 The current proliferation of federal criminal statutes that virtually
overlap almost identical state offenses will eviscerate the constitutional double jeopardy
protection by allowing state and federal prosecution for the same conduct. The excep-
tion to double jeopardy-the doctrine of dual sovereignty-which generally allows
prosecution for the same conduct in both state and federal courts on the theory that the
state and federal governments are two separate sovereigns entitled to enforce its own
laws, makes such successive prosecutions possible. 3 But ceding this relatively new,
judicially-created power to the government runs contrary to the history, practice, and
policy behind the bar against placing one in jeopardy twice.
The principle of double jeopardy has deep historical roots. In the Jewish Talmud,
the prohibition dates back to the secoid century of the Common Era:8" "A party stood
his trial and was found not guilty, he must not again be brought in jeopardy for the
78. Rehnquist, supra note 72, at 9-10.
79. Wallace, supra note 50, at 12.
80. Miner, supra note 46, at 39.
81. Robert Pear, Judicial Panel Proposes Limits On Cases Before Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1994, at Al.
82. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (double jeopardy bar applies to states) (quot-
ing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
83. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960);
Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE, § 24.5(a), 922 (1985).
84. SANHEDFN, Ch. V, Mishnah 40(a).
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same offense."85 In Roman law, the guarantee can be found in the Code of Justinian
(533 C.E.).1 6 In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the concept can be found in
Blackstone's explanation of the common law plea of autrefoits acquit or former acquit-
tal: "that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the same
t1me87crime.
's
This concept was recognized in the colonies as early as 1641 by the Massachu-
setts Body of Liberties. Mirroring Blackstone's language, the Framers included it in
the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights: "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.""8 The prohibition serves a
number of desirable ends. It supports the balance of individual rights against the power
of government, provides fundamental fairness to those charged with offenses, cuts
down on the potential for prosecutorial abuse, and affords finality to criminal proceed-
ings."
Traditional analysis of double jeopardy comes from an era when federal criminal
jurisdiction was limited, as was the potential for subsequent state-federal prosecutions.
In Blockburger v. United States,'° the Supreme Court concluded that where the two
offenses for which the defendant is either prosecuted or punished have the "same ele-
ments," the prohibition against double jeopardy prohibits the subsequent action. The
Blockburger test focuses on "whether each offense contains an element not contained
in the other; if not, they are the "same offense" and double jeopardy bars additional
punishment and successive prosecution. '
In 1990, through Grady v. Corbin, the Court briefly experimented with a more
demanding "same conduct" test under which subsequent prosecution would be barred
"if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the
government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." '92 Three years later, however, in United States v. Dixon, the
Court readopted the Blockburger "same elements" test and overruled the Grady "same
conduct" test. 3
By retreating from its more exacting standard of Grady, the Court opened the
door for the successive prosecution of persons under marginally different statutes.
Justice Souter seized upon this potential problem in his dissent, noting:
If a separate prosecution were permitted for every offense arising out of the same
conduct, the government could manipulate distinctions among them permitting a
85. SANHEDRIN, 32(b)-33(b) cited in S. MENDELSOHN, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF ANCIENT
HEBREWS 151, n. 358 (1968).
86. J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969).
87. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 331 (University of Chicago Ed., 1979).
88. LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION, 142 (1988); U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
89. PAuL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, § 526(a), at 103 (1984).
90. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (barring multiple punishment).
91. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct 2849, 2856 (1993).
92. United States v. Grady, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (The Court affirmed a reversal of convic-
tion for criminal contempt of court for violating court orders that prohibited engaging in conduct
which was later the subject of a criminal prosecution. The subsequent criminal prosecutions were
barred.)
93. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860. (Grady was overruled because it "lack[ed constitutional roots" and
was "wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law under-
standing of double jeopardy.")
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zealous prosecutor to try a person again and again for essentially the same con-
duct.94
This lroblem is magnified by the possibility that persons may first be subject to prose-
cution under traditional state criminal laws, and later be subject to prosecution under a
wide range of new parallel federal offenses. These federal offenses may be only mar-
ginally different from the state offense-perhaps differing only by as little as a single
element requiring a federal nexus. Indeed, soon after Lopez was published, Sen. Kohl
(D-WI) introduced a bill to allow federal prosecution of the conduct at issue in Lopez
by adding the federal interstate commerce element to what was essentially the state
offense, a proposal which could open the door to the dangers Justice Souter warned
against.'
Under such a system, one might "wonder whether the double jeopardy clause
provides any real check on legislative power.' 96 Nothing would bar, for example, fed-
eral prosecutors who are unhappy over defendants' state court acquittals from routinely
prosecuting the same conduct in federal court. The threat of such successive prosecu-
tions might even be used to coerce guilty pleas in state court.97 The potential for suc-
cessive prosecutions could also impede the processing of cases in state courts, and
make that system unworkably complex because state court defendants and their attor-
neys would weigh the possible federal consequences of a plea of guilty in state court
which could later become a sworn, in-court admission of guilt to be used in a subse-
quent federal prosecution. The bar against double jeopardy would not remain a consti-
tutional protection, but would become a policy enforced at the will of prosecutors.
Such practices may not be barred by current case law, but they surely violate both the
letter and the spirit of the prohibition against double jeopardy. This trend could be
reversed, however, if Lopez proves to be a limit on the federalization of state criminal
laws.
IV. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE
Many commentators have warned that Lopez is the first step in a broad revision
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence which will result in a significant roll-back of feder-
al programs.98 Justice Souter's dissent, for instance, hinted that the Court could be re-
newing substantive due process analysis." More likely, the case signals both the
Court's commitment to maintain the balance between the federal government and the
states by retaining the states' primary role in the enforcement of criminal laws, and the
Court's concern about maintaining the viability of the federal courts as an institution.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion begins by focusing on the central issue: whether, in
its exercise of power claimed under the Commerce Clause, Congress has exceeded the
proper limits of its authority and tipped "the balance of power between the States and
94. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2883.
95. 141 CONG. REC. S7920 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (applies to a " ... firearm that has moved
in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce . (quoting S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 2, 2(A) (1995)).
96. David 0. Stewart, What Is Double Jeopardy, A.B.A.J., (Sept., 1993) 50, 52 (quoting Prof.
Anne Coughlin of Vanderbilt University School of Law).
97. Wallace, supra note 50, at 52.
98. Stewart, supra note 96, at 50.
99. Lopez, 115 S. C. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting); David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce
Clause, A.B.A.J. (July, 1995) 46.
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the federal government."'" Rehnquist reaffirms the Court's role in maintaining the
balance, noting that, while the power of Congress to regulate commerce is broad, it has
limits which the Court has "ample power" to enforce.' Rehnquist's test is whether
the conduct regulated is not just activity-but economic activity-which substantially
affects interstate commerce.' 2 Rehnquist's analysis is clearly a departure from or
gloss on precedent in two respects. First, it more carefully scrutinizes the validity of
the federal assertion of power by requiring that the activity in question must be eco-
nomic. Second, Rehnquist resolves ambiguity in precedent by ruling that, for Congress
to have power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, an activity must not merely
affect interstate commerce; the affect must be substantial. 3
Applying the test, Rehnquist found the law "a criminal statute that by its terms
has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broad-
ly one might define those terms."'" In reaching this conclusion, he contrasted
Wickard v. Filburn,°5 which he characterized as "perhaps the most far reaching ex-
ample of Commerce Clause authority . . . " with the case at hand."° In Wickard, the
Court had found that even homegrown wheat had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. While Filburn's wheat never left his farm, his consumption of that wheat,
"taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."' 7 Ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, however, Wickard "involved economic activity in a way
that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not."'0 8 This was also the conclu-
sion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, which found the
statute regulating "beyond the realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of
that term."'" Moreover, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion traced how far the con-
duct covered by the statute differed from the meaning of "commerce" as understood by
the Framers."o
Less clear is the weight to be given the effects of the federal government's asser-
tion of power on the states, which rest on the other side of the fulcrum."' Justice
Rehnquist notes that the scope of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce
must be considered in light of the state-federal balance-the "dual system"-and feder-
al power must not be extended over effects of interstate commerce "so indirect and
remote that to embrace them ... would effectively obliterate the distinction between
what is national and local and create a completely centralized government.""' In po-
100. Id. at 1626 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).
101. Id. at 1629 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
102. Id. at 1630.
103. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the Court should only
require a significant effect, thus broadening the scope of Congressional power. Id. at 1657. (Breyer, J.
dissenting).
104. Id. at 1630-31.
105. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
106. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
107. Id. at 1628 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 125). In contrast to Wickard, Rehnquist
noted that "ft]he possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 1634.
108. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
109. Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1642-51.
111. See infra note 116.




licing this distinction and maintaining this balance between the federal and state
spheres, the Court must decide if federal power has encroached upon state power. The
Court must then strike down such federal encroachments in order to maintain the bal-
ance.
This consideration could be viewed as included within the determination of
whether the activity is commerce or something else, which falls on the states' side of
the fulcrum. Indeed, in the sentence in which Justice Rehnquist holds that Lopez did
not concern commerce, he finds that it involves a "criminal statute." He clarifies that
finding in a footnote highlighting that the "states possess primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law"" 3 and that "[wihen Congress criminalizes conduct
already denounced as criminal by the States, it affects a 'change in the sensitive rela-
tion between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.""' 4 This focus on areas of state
power was also noted by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence, where he suggested that
given the potential for Congress to vastly expand federal jurisdiction under the Com-
merce Clause, the Court "must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to
intrude upon an area of traditional state concern."
' 5
Justice Breyer's dissent, by contrast, does not focus on the effect of federal pow-
er on the state-federal balance or on the federal law's impact on areas of traditional
state concern. This is reflected in his test for the validity of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, which examines whether Congress had a rational basis for conclud-
ing that an activity has a significant effect on interstate commerce."6 To Justice
Rehnquist, this test provides virtually no limit on assertions of "federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign.""' 7 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy pointed to the same problem:
"[iln a sense, any conduct in this interdependent world of ours has an ultimate com-
mercial origin or consequence .... ""'
To assess the effect of Lopez on future cases, the decision must first be placed in
context. Congress may regulate the following three categories of activity under the
Commerce Clause: the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce, and commercial
activities which may be intrastate, which have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce."" As Lopez sets limits on only the last category of "substantial effects", stat-
utes relying on the first two categories are not explicitly affected. For instance, in
113. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n. 3 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993)).
114. Id. at 1631 (citing U.S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)).
115. Id. at 1640. Justice Kennedy also discusses how the statute tends to "displace some regulation
in areas of traditional state concern." Id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Ten years earlier the Court
rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice," a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation based on a judicial appraisal of whether a governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) (holding that mini-
mum wage and overtime provisions apply to the states).
116. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659-61, 1665.
117. Id. at 1632.
118. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Justice Thomas pointed to the problem with Wickard's
aggregate effect test stating that, "the aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point." Id. at
1650. (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1628-29. "The 'affecting commerce' test was developed in our jurisprudence to define
the extent of Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have sub-
stantial interstate effects." U.S. v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995).
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United States v. Robertson,120 a per curium opinion issued just six days after Lopez,
the Court upheld Commerce Clause jurisdiction in the federal RICO prosecution of an
Alaskan gold mine in which the proceeds of narcotics transactions had been invested.
The Court did not consider the "substantial effects" test because the corporation was
"directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods and services
in interstate commerce."'' Moreover, within this third, or "substantial effects" cate-
gory, Justice Rehnquist left open the possibility for Congress to regulate if the statute
includes a jurisdictional element, by which courts could determine on a case-by-case
basis whether interstate commerce was substantially effected.
22
The following final factor is critical in assessing the impact of Lopez and predict-
ing its consequences: Chief Justice Rehnquist's goal of maintaining the viability of the
federal courts in the face of Congress's seemingly limitless ability to create federal
crimes. In his 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, and other similar re-
ports in past years, Rehnquist has warned that the crushing numbers of new federal
criminal cases threatens the integrity of the federal courts. 23 In his A.B.A. speech,
Justice Rehnquist previewed many of the themes of Lopez. He highlighted the theme
of balance, quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren's admonition on the importance of
achieving a "proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state court systems,
assigning to each system those cases most appropriate.' ' 24 Rehnquist has also warned
against a policy which would "shift large numbers of cases presently being decided in
the state courts to the federal courts for reasons which are largely symbolic."'' 2' He
cautioned Congress to "avoid adding new federal causes of action unless critical to
meeting important national interests which cannot otherwise be satisfied through non-
judicial forums .... or state courts." 6 Finally, Rehnquist questioned "whether the
state courts presently deal, and deal with reasonable effectiveness, with these same
matters."'2 7
While Lopez circumscribes federal regulatory power, the Court set clear limits on
the decision's scope. For instance, Lopez clearly left intact the precedent of civil rights
cases such as Katzenback v. McClung28 and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S.'29
The activities which gave rise to federal authority in both cases were characterized as
120. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
121. As mining equipment and supplies were purchased in California and transported to Alaska, the
Court concluded that the mine was engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 1733. The Court relied on
United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975) (allegation that
company made local purchases of equipment and supplies that were merely manufactured out of state
was insufficient to show that company was "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of § 7 of the
Clayton Act) (emphasis in original).
122. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
123. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1992 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Dec.
1992) in THE THiRD BRANCH, Jan. 1993, at 1-6.
124. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before the House of Delegates at the American
Bar Association's Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 4, 1992), in A.B.A., at 13-14.
125. Id. at 14. In Sandin v. Conner, Justice Rehnquist echoed these concerns in condemning "the
involvement of the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial
resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone." 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995). See also Linda
Greenhouse, High Court Makes it Harder for Prisoners to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at All.
126. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before the House of Delegates at the American
Bar Association's Mid-Year Meeting (Feb. 4, 1992), in A.B.A., at 10 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 13-14.
128. Katzenback v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
129. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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commercial-restaurants utilizing interstate supplies and inns and hotels catering to
interstate guests. Indeed, Rehnquist cited these cases as examples of economic activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce. 3 ° In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
pointed to these-cases where "commercial transactions were the subject of regula-
tions ... and are not called into question by our opinion today."'
3
1
Lopez clearly raises questions about other federal statutes, especially those cover-
ing the same conduct as criminal laws traditionally enforced by the states. These ques-
tions are apparent in the federal "carjacking" statute-the Anticar Theft Act of
1992-which prohibits using a weapon to steal a car which has "been transported,
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce."'3' They may also be present
in Sen. Kohl's legislation to reverse the effect of Lopez; it applies to a "firearm that
has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce .... ,,133 First,
the activity of using a gun to steal a car is plainly distinguishable from commercial
activity such as operating a restaurant or a hotel which has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, or from operating a mine which is engaged in interstate com-
merce. Second, if carjacking has the requisite Commerce Clause connection, "virtually
all thefts-right down to shoplifting can be federal offenses."'3 Such limitless feder-
al jurisdiction is exactly the threat to the viability of the federal courts of which Justice
Rehnquist warns. Third, the ordinary criminal laws traditionally left to the states cover
the same conduct; it-is conduct with which the states "presently deal, and deal with
reasonable effectiveness."'35 Finally, upholding such an expansion of federal jurisdic-
tion would be far from the Framers' intent. As a federal district court noted in reject-
ing the interstate commerce basis for federal jurisdiction over carjacking:
If anything that will take you across a state line is an "instrumentality of com-
merce," then there is justification for Congress to regulate anything done on a
bicycle or, for that matter, on foot. The Framers traveled to Philadelphia on horse-
back or by horse and carriage. Can it be imagined that in constructing the Com-
merce Clause they intended to regulate and punish horse stealing?'"
CONCLUSION
In Lopez, the Court has reinvigorated the balance of power between the states
and the federal government by clarifying the limits of Commerce Clause jurisdiction
and reversing federal encroachment into the states' traditional powers over criminal
laws. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out from the bench, in speeches, and in reports, this
intrusion has threatened to tip the fragile balance of power between the federal govern-
ment and the states and to inundate the federal courts with criminal cases, diluting or
destroying their effectiveness. This federalization of state crimes also violates both the
letter and the spirit of the ban against double jeopardy, and threatens to turn that time-
tested constitutional limit on government power into a policy enforced at the will of
130. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
131. Id. at 1637.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992).
133. S. 890, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 2(A) (1995).
134. Stewart, supra note 98, at 46.
135. Rehnquist, supra note 124, at 13-14.
136. United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 243 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd, sub nom. United
States v. Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion).
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prosecutors.
Predictions of a new era of states' rights and limited federal government are
overblown. Lopez reaffirms a distinction which had developed during Colonial times
and which took root in the Constitution: the states' play the key role in enforcing crim-
inal law as the "immediate and visible guardians of life and property," '37 while the
federal government takes the lead in regulating interstate commerce. In affirming this
distinction, the Court has sent the Lopez case and potentially thousands of similar cas-
es, back where they belong-the state courts, which "presently deal, and deal with
reasonable effectiveness" with the enforcement of criminal laws. 3
137. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
138. Rehnquist, supra note 124, at 13-14.
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